Rafale, F-15, KF-21: Is it enough to buy good fighters? An IISS report scathingly criticizes the Indonesian Air Force’s misshapen force structure.
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KF-21 Boramae has been the most reported on by local media Zona Jakarta, which quoted a statement made by Moeldoko , the Chief Presidential Secretary, at a cabinet meeting held in Jakarta last October 2, and reported that intellectual property rights , contract terms , and marketing issues related to the KF-21 Boramae should be discussed promptly with Korea .
Even in an article from October 12, it spread the wings of imagination that if the issues of intellectual property rights , contract terms , and marketing can be resolved, not only can Indonesia create its own version of the KF-21 Boramae and sell it to other countries without Korea’s permission, but it can also receive the so-called four core technologies consisting of AESA radar, EOTGP, IRST and electronic warfare systems from Korea .
KF-21 Boramae, who is responsible for only 20% of the total development cost, was somewhat angry beyond the absurdity of the content of the article by Zona Jakarta , which expects a 120% compensation . It was unbelievable how people with the profession of journalists could write such low-level articles . Even if you look up a little bit of data on international defense trade that has been concluded so far, you can quickly see how absurd the content claimed by Zona Jakarta is .
In addition, no matter how much I looked at the articles of Zona Jakarta , it was unpleasant that I could not find an article questioning the technology transfer to France, which purchased 42 Rafales worth more than 1.5 billion won per unit . The Indonesian government, which is claiming the right to export overseas and technology transfer even in the state of defaulting on the KF-21 Boramae development share of nearly 1 trillion won, does not understand why it does not mention anything related to technology transfer to the French government when it purchases Rafale by investing a huge amount of nearly 6 trillion won . It’s not even that France is more generous than Korea in technology transfer .
Suddenly, I remembered the story that the Indonesian defense official I met at the 2023 MADEX told me. “The Indonesian media are nothing more than a ‘mouth’ representing the government’s position, and they are not providing proper information to the people.” I thought it wouldn’t be unfounded .
Nevertheless, the contribution of Dzaky Naradichiantama , an Indonesian-born defense analyst active at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), opened my chest that was stifled by reading articles below the level posted by Zona Jakarta . It shows a logic that is different from the articles that only represent the logic of water pulling (我田引水) and the position of the Indonesian government, regardless of objective facts and understanding of international politics .
Then, let’s translate the article posted by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on October 3, 2023, and continue the story .
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The Indonesian Air Force has bold ambitions to restructure its tactical aircraft configuration . However, the litmus test that will tell whether the Indonesian Air Force’s ambition will succeed or fail seems to be the procurement and operation of new fighters .
If the extensive fighter procurement plans currently being prepared are executed without a hitch, the Indonesian Air Force (IDAF) will undergo unprecedented changes over the next 20 years . However, such efforts may not achieve the intended results or even fail due to various factors, and one particularly headache-inducing problem is that it is extremely difficult to effectively introduce and operate various types of fighters introduced from many countries .
Indonesia’s ambition to better protect its vast territory composed of many islands, due to the deteriorating regional security environment, supports this air force power reform . The Indonesian government’s efforts to modernize its own Air Force (IDAF) and other military resources are partly triggered by concerns about China’s unilateral actions in the South China Sea and the need to replace decades-old weapons and equipment .
The Indonesian military modernization basic plan was written about 15 years ago, but gained new momentum since Prabowo Subianto was appointed Minister of Defense in 2019, and since then the Indonesian Ministry of Defense has concluded billions of dollars , massive deals worth trillions of won at current exchange rates to purchase new fighters and transport aircraft . However, such large-scale transactions also raise questions about how the Indonesian authorities can successfully transition to new aircraft types .
The atmosphere of change that is watching
The Indonesian government has ordered 3 types of multi-purpose fighters and procurement projects are underway almost simultaneously. In February 2022, Indonesia agreed to purchase up to 42 Rafales , and Dassault , the manufacturer of Rafale , announced that in addition to the first delivery of 6 units announced in September 2022, an additional order of 18 units for the second delivery in August 2023 . In addition, the Indonesian government has temporarily imported 9 Dassault Mirage 2000ED fighters and 3 2000D fighters from the Qatar Air Force for 8,643 million dollars , or about 1.6 trillion won in Korean currency . In August, it also signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to procure up to 24 F-15EX Eagle II fighters from Boeing in the United States .
In addition to the new fighters mentioned so far, Indonesia is participating in the KF-21 Boramae multi-purpose fighter being developed by Korea, but it is not paying the necessary funds for development on time .
The French Rafale and the F-15IDN , which is named after the F-15EX, are expected to replace the retired Northrop F-5E/F Tiger II and the aging BAE Hawk 109/209 . The French Rafale is expected to arrive in Indonesia by 2026, but the delivery schedule for the U.S. F-15EX has not yet been released . The reason for introducing as many as 12 used Mirage fighters is to fill the gap that occurs before the Rafale arrives and to provide the Indonesian Air Force (IDAF), which has no previous experience of operating French fighters, with experience of operating and supporting Dassault fighters . However, it is impossible to determine whether the transition to a new type can proceed smoothly as the Indonesian government wishes, and it will be necessary to wait and see .
In the face of unpredictable reality and Indonesia’s ambitions
Once the Mirage 2000 is delivered, it will be operated as a single squadron at the Supadio Air Force Base in West Kalimantan, near the Natuna Sea bordering the South China Sea. The BAE Hawk 109/209 currently operated at this base may be integrated into the 12th Squadron at the Roesmin Nurjadin Air Force Base in Riau Province. Ultimately, it is highly likely that either the Rafale or the F-15EX will be deployed to the 1st or 12th Squadron, and there is a possibility that both may be deployed. The new combat squadron that the Indonesian Air Force (IDAF) intends to operate as part of its efforts to expand combat flight capabilities will be composed of these two types.
Senior officers of the Indonesian Air Force have been discussing plans to expand the existing Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) to cover Java, Bali, and parts of southern Sumatra and western Nusa Tenggara, thereby including Indonesia’s entire Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the ADIZ. In addition, the Indonesian military has been working to redeploy military assets, expand units and bases, and extend squadrons to the east in order to more effectively protect the sea routes connecting the many archipelagos scattered throughout Papua, in response to internal security issues in the region, over the past 10 years.
The need for air power capable of conducting operations beyond military strongholds located in Java to remote islands is becoming increasingly urgent, and the necessity to patrol Indonesia’s vast airspace, where dozens of intrusions by aircraft from other countries located within or outside the region have been witnessed in recent years, is becoming more pressing. Potential incidents surrounding the South China Sea are also exacerbating the anxieties of Indonesian security officials.
Future Challenges
While the security environment is becoming more challenging, the Indonesian Air Force is facing a series of structural challenges that could pose a significant barrier to addressing this security environment. One of them is the fact that the Indonesian Air Force authorities are not properly preparing the infrastructure and personnel needed to operate and maintain new platforms.
The process of training pilots to perform missions on new platforms is arguably the most important, but it is not matching the purchase of fighter jets. Despite the need for approximately 36 to 48 new pilots based on the number of newly purchased fighter jets, the number of pilots trained by the Indonesian Air Force in recent years is only about 1/4 to 1/3 of the required number, or only 12. Is that the only problem? A considerable number of air force bases that need to operate fighter jets also need to be upgraded to match the newly purchased fighter jets.
Enhancing operational readiness, also known as availability, will continue to be a difficult challenge. Over the past 10 years, it is estimated that approximately 50~60% of the frontline fighters of the Indonesian Air Force (IDAF) were unable to perform operations on average, and there were nine major accidents related to fighters and trainers from 2010 to 2021.
Finally, if the French Rafale and the American F-15EX fighters are both delivered as scheduled, the Indonesian Air Force will have to operate fighters introduced from Brazil, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States at the same time, and questions are raised about how well the different platforms can be integrated into the logistics system. The Indonesian government is taking the risk of learning a famous old lesson from the history of foreign fighter jet purchases. “Buying fighter jets is easy. But placing them in the right place and operating them properly is not something anyone can do.”
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This concludes the translation of a report written by Jaki Nuradityantama, a defense analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), on October 3, 2023.
What’s excellent about this report is that it allows us to see from the Indonesian perspective the answer to the question, “Why did Indonesia order the Rafale or F-15EX while participating in the KF-21 Boramae program?” while clearly showing where Indonesia is making mistakes despite this.
The need for Indonesia to counter China, which is gaining strength in the face of the serious aging of existing fighter jets and the difficulty in receiving fighter jets from Russia, was clearly understood through this report. However, the Indonesian Air Force’s decision to immediately introduce the Rafale(Rafale) and F-15EX to replace the F-5E/F Tiger II, which is understood as a light fighter class, and the BAE Hawk 109/209, a trainer and attack aircraft, gives the impression that ambition is ahead of reality.
Among the foreign articles written by foreign military experts, there were contents pointing out that the number of KF-21 Boramaes that can be introduced in replacement of the retiring F-5E/Fs will be significantly reduced due to the skyrocketing operating and maintenance costs compared to the F-5E/Fs. Then, can it be a rational decision to introduce the Rafale(Rafale) or F-15EX, which require higher introduction costs and hourly operating and maintenance costs than the KF-21 Boramae, instead of the F-5E/F?
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) points out that there are many other problems. One of the problems is that as the types of aircraft introduced are diversified into Brazil, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States, integration becomes difficult, and even if integration is achieved, more costs will be required than in the case of a unified system.
In fact, what’s more headache-inducing than the cost is the issue of maintenance and repair. As the IISS has already pointed out, over the past 10 years, it is estimated that more than half, or about 50~60%, of the frontline fighters of the Indonesian Air Force (IDAF) were unable to perform operations on average. So, how much availability can the Indonesian Air Force expect if it introduces more complex and sensitive latest fighters from various countries such as the Rafale, F-15, KF-21 Boramae, and Su-30? Can Indonesian Air Force maintenance engineers with limited budgets and manpower properly manage the Rafale, F-15, KF-21 Boramae, Su-30, etc.?
What Zona Jakarta needs to inform Indonesian citizens through newspaper articles is exactly these things. The factor that can determine the future of air power is not in buying expensive and good fighter jets, but in buying cost-effective fighter jets suitable for domestic situations and managing them properly, says Jaki Nuradityantama, a defense analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “Buying fighter jets is easy. But placing them in the right place and operating them properly is not something anyone can do.”
